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1 Natural Kinds, Essences and Scientific Categories 
We live in a world full of things: a world which is full not only of particulars, but 
also of groups or collections of things. Scientific laws and explanations are often 
about such groups or collections of things. It is often assumed that the groups of 
things science is about reflect the actual structure of the world. It is assumed, in 
other words, that science discovers natural kinds - that is, Nature’s actual joints. 
Philosophers often define natural kinds in essentialistic terms: to be a member 
of a natural kind means to share an "essence” with the other members of that 
kind. Such an essence can be an idea (Plato), a list of essential attributes 
(Aristotle), a set of necessary and jointly sufficient properties (Putnam and 
Kripke). Essentialism is traditionally opposed to conventionalism, for which kinds 
do not correspond to the real structure of the world and are useful human 
constructions. 
In more recent times, some philosophers have started to question the "natural 
kinds-essentialism" link. Some have argued that the existence of an essence is an 
unnecessary metaphysical assumption (Mellor, 1977). Others have urged us to 
consider whether the idea of a rigid or static essence can do justice to the often 
dynamic and mutable kinds in biology and in the other special sciences (Dupré, 
1981, 1993). For these philosophers, speaking about natural kinds does not imply 
speaking of essences. 
Moreover, the debate on natural kinds is gaining a renewed momentum due to a 
general shift in how metaphysics is conceived. A growing number of philosophers 
has abandoned the a priori speculations typical of the so-called "armchair 
philosophy" and is pursuing philosophy in a naturalistic fashion: in a way, that is, 
which is both consistent and continuous with the sciences. Naturalized 
metaphysicians, therefore, look at the sciences to develop and test their 
philosophical conceptions of natural kinds. 
It must be specified that while naturalism is opposed to a priori speculations and 
while essentialism is opposed to conventionalism, naturalism is not necessarily 
opposed to essentialism. Although philosophers like Dupré use examples from the 
special sciences to argue against essentialism, philosophers like LaPorte (2004) 
accept the idea that natural kinds have essences, but argues that such essences 
are discovered a posteriori and through the self-correcting dynamics of conceptual 
change and precisification characteristic of the development of the sciences. 
Natural Categories and Human Kinds (Khalidi, 2013) is a recent and timely 
contribution to current debate on natural kinds. Because of the growing 
sophistication of this debate, it is necessary to make careful distinctions in order 
to appreciate the originality of Khalidi’s position. Khalidi’s view on natural kinds is 
naturalistic: if we want to know what Nature’s joints really are, we should look at 
the actual carving job carried out by our best scientific practices. Like LaPorte, 
Khalidi is a fallibilist: our best scientific theories may be revised or abandoned and 
so can our current classifications of natural kinds. Unlike LaPorte, however, Khalidi 
is an anti-essentialist: he argues against the idea that membership in a natural 
kind is a matter of possessing an essential set of necessary and sufficient 
properties. Like Dupré, Khalidi is a pluralist and anti-reductionist: he does not 
believe that there is only one true classification system and that there are natural 
kinds only at the so-called "fundamental level" of microphysics. Khalidi develops 
his pluralistic and anti-reductionistic position on the basis of a deep appreciation 
for the special sciences but, unlike Dupré, he thinks that only the scientific 
inquiry, which is driven by epistemic purposes, discover natural kinds and that, 
therefore, there are important differences between scientific and folk 
classifications.  
Khalidi’s conception of natural kinds has both an epistemic and a metaphysical 
component. The epistemic component is evident from the title of the book: Khalidi 
does not speak of "natural kinds" (things the human independent world really 
consists of) on the one hand and of "human categories" (human-made categories 
devised for classificatory purposes) on the other. In his view, natural kinds 
correspond to the categories that (both natural and social) scientists use in 
inductive generalizations, explanations and scientific laws.  
The metaphysical reason for why natural kinds correspond to scientific 
categories is that they are “nodes in causal networks” (Khalidi 2013, 200): in other 
words, natural kinds are “associated with properties instantiated by the co-
instantiation of other properties” (Khalidi 2013, 80) clustered together in virtue of 
some causal relation. One of the examples Khalidi uses to explain his conception of 
natural kinds is the property of viscosity, that is the measure of the resistance to 
flow within a substance. In fluid mechanics, the property of viscosity is associated 
to the natural kind of Newtonian fluid, the viscosity of which remains constant. 
Viscosity can be associated with different sets of properties: in fact, while the 
viscosity of a fluid depends on the strength of its chemical bonds, the viscosity of a 
gas depends by the density of its molecules and the viscosity of a porous solid is 
depends by the size of its pores. This means that different "networks of properties" 
instantiate the property of viscosity, which in turn is associated with some natural 
kinds like Newtonian fluid.  
It is important to stress that, for Khalidi, the link between properties and 
natural kinds is not accidental. In his account, and in a sense which will be discussed 
in more detail in section 3, some properties are causally associated with others; 
the "networks of properties" Khalidi speaks about are "causal networks".  Khalidi 
follows Chakravartty (2007, 170), who says that “Properties, or property instances, 
are not the sort of things that come randomly distributed across space-time. They 
are systematically ‘sociable’ in various ways”. Khalidi adopts Chakravartty’s 
metaphor of the systematic sociability of some properties, adding that natural 
kinds are “the locus of this sociability” (Khalidi 2013, 14).  
To summarize: since natural kinds are implicated in the repeatable causal 
patterns of their properties (metaphysical component), natural kinds are 
"projectible" and, therefore, are the basis for the explanations, generalizations 
and laws in the sciences (epistemic component). 
One of the book’s merits is that, before developing a positive account of natural 
kinds, in Chapter I Khalidi analyses and ultimately refutes essentialism, both in its 
traditional formulations and in its more recent developments (i.e., Ellis 2001, 
Wilkerson 1988). Khalidi disentangles with great clarity five essentialist theses: 
necessity and sufficiency, modal necessity, intrinsicality (the members of a natural 
kind always possess all its essential properties, no matter what their relation with 
the other things in the world is), microstructure (the essential properties of a kind 
are located at the "fundamental level") and discoverability by science. For Khalidi, 
all the members of the same natural kind do not have to share the same set of 
necessary and sufficient properties, the special sciences discover natural kinds the 
properties of which cannot be reduced to some more fundamental level, there is 
not only one true classification and natural kinds may be "fuzzy" and overlapping. 
He develops compelling arguments against all of the essentialistic theses but the 
last one: Khalidi in fact agrees that natural kinds are discoverable by science. 
In Chapter II, Khalidi develops his view of natural kinds as nodes of causally 
linked properties instantiated by the co-instantiation of other properties. He 
further develops this argument in Chapters III, IV and V, where he discusses several 
examples of natural kinds in the special sciences, including the social sciences. 
In the final chapter, Khalidi reflects on his naturalistic approach and tackles in 
more depth the thorny issue of realism. In his view, the categories of the social 
sciences are natural kinds despite being "mind-dependent". For instance, although 
the categories of the human sciences "depend" on the existence of human minds, 
such a mind-dependence does not undermine the fact that some of them are real 
kinds. Khalidi’s view invites a serious reconsideration of the traditional realism 
debate, starting from a finer characterisation of the "mind-dependent vs mind-
independent" dichotomy. 
Natural Categories and Human Kinds is full of interesting arguments to which I 
cannot do justice within the limits of this review. In the following sections, I will 
limit myself to a general assessment of the epistemic and the metaphysical 
components of Khalidi’s conception of natural kinds. In particular, I will discuss the 
relationship between kinds, generalizations and laws on the one hand (section 2) 
and Khalidi’s "simple causal theory" on the other (section 3). I will conclude my 
review by discussing what I think is one of Khalidi’s most original insights: his view 
about levels and domains (section 4). 
!
2 The Epistemic Component: Science, Generalizations and Laws 
In Khalidi’s view, science discovers natural kinds and their properties, which are 
projectible. In virtue of such projectibility, natural kinds possess explanatory 
power and are used as a basis for inductive generalisations and laws. Natural kinds 
therefore corresponds to  categories appearing in generalisations and laws. 
Khalidi disagrees with those philosophers, like Dupré (1999), who argue that 
both scientific and folk classifications may reflect real subdivisions. This is 
because, in his view, scientific classifications are primarily introduced to serve 
what he calls "epistemic purposes", while folk classifications often serve "non-
epistemic" purposes. If folk classifications happen to individuate some natural 
kinds, then these natural kinds will “tend to be aligned with categories found in 
one or the other branches of the sciences or they become so aligned in the course 
of inquiry” (Khalidi 2013, 64). Khalidi maintains that his position should not be 
deemed as “insular or scientistic”, since it “merely identifies natural kinds with 
the categories that are posited as a result of a systematic inquiry, as opposed to 
categories that we might be inclined to conceive as a result of a casual or passing 
acquaintance with some aspects of reality” (Khalidi 2013, 55-56).  
It is not entirely clear, however, whether it is always possible to make a neat 
distinction between the epistemic and non-epistemic purposes driving an activity 
or a form of inquiry. It is also debatable whether science is the only systematic 
inquiry, or whether it is always the case that non-scientific activities have a casual 
or passing acquaintance with the natural world. Gastronomy, for instance, appears 
to be a rather systematic inquiry which is driven by the purpose of discovering 
some interesting and projectible properties of food; it would be difficult, however, 
to say whether the purpose of "discovering some properties of food in order to 
know how to make dishes which taste good" is either "completely epistemic" or 
"completely non-epistemic". This point is exemplified by a recent monograph on 
the "science of chocolate" published by the Royal Society of Chemistry (Beckett, 
2008). Is the "science of chocolate" an actual science? If it is, is it driven only by 
epistemic purposes? If it is not, does it nonetheless happen to discover something 
true about the properties of cocoa? Furthermore, it is also debatable whether 
science is driven only and exclusively by epistemic purposes. Here I will not try to 
assess, or even summarise, the current status of the debate on whether science is 
an exclusively epistemic and "value-free" activity. I will only suggest that perhaps 
the separation between epistemic and non-epistemic purposes is not as clear-cut 
as Khalidi seems to suggest. 
Leaving aside Khalidi’s (perhaps too rigid) distinction between epistemic and 
non-epistemic activities, in the remainder of this section I want to focus on 
another issue concerning the epistemic aspect of his account of natural kinds. 
Throughout his book, Khalidi claims that natural kinds corresponds to the scientific 
categories used in inductive generalisations and scientific laws. However, he does 
not discuss the differences between "generalizations" and "laws" (or whether such 
differences may pose some problems to his view). 
A widely discussed example of the differences between generalizations and laws 
is the comparison between two general statements involving two natural kinds, 
namely gold and uranium: "every sphere of gold (Au) is less than a mile in 
diameter" and "every sphere of enriched uranium (U235) is less than a mile in 
diameter". The first statement is only contingently true: it just happens that there 
is not enough gold in the world to make a gigantic gold sphere, but there is nothing 
in the nature of gold which would forbid the in principle existence of a gold sphere 
with a mile long diameter. A uranium sphere of a mile in diameter, by contrast, 
would be well beyond uranium’s critical mass, the amount of mass necessary to 
maintain a nuclear chain reaction. The second statement is therefore necessarily 
true: it is physically impossible to have a sphere of uranium of that size. That is 
why the second statement is a law, not a simple generalization (see the discussion 
in van Fraassen, 1989, p. 27).  
Khalidi is interested in how science groups things on the basis of "relevant 
properties" – properties which are projectible and possess explanatory power.  The 
difference between laws and generalizations is that the latter may group things on 
the basis of properties which are not prejectible and do not possess explanatory 
power. Do these consideration pose a threat to Khalidi’s account of natural kinds? 
Not necessarily. For instance, Khalidi could just amend his position by saying that 
natural kinds correspond to the categories of science appearing only in scientific 
laws (after carefully distinguishing scientific laws from generalizations). The point 
remains, however, that Khalidi’s account would benefit from a better articulation 
of the relationship between "natural kinds", "generalizations" and "scientific laws". 
 In concluding this section, I must clarify that Khalidi says that natural kinds are 
discoverable by science, not that all scientific categories of science correspond to 
natural kinds. Paraphrasing Socrates’s response to Euthyphro’s definition of piety, 
Khalidi explains that “a kind is not natural because it is a scientific kind; rather, it 
is a scientific kind because it is natural” (Khalidi 2013, 79). Saying that natural 
kinds are scientific categories may tell us something about how to recognize 
natural kinds, but it still does not tell us what makes something a natural kind. It is 
in order to solve the “Euthyphro’s problem of natural kinds” that Khalidi adds a 
metaphysical component to his conception. 
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3 The Metaphysical Component: From Causal Mechanisms to Simple Causes 
Science does not determine what natural kinds are, it only gives us a reliable 
guide to discover them. What we need is an explanation of why natural kinds 
correspond to scientific categories. What begins as an epistemic conception of 
natural kinds leads Khalidi to take a metaphysical step toward causality. 
Things can be classified in different ways, depending on the set of properties 
one looks at. On the one hand, not every set of properties defines a natural kind. 
For example, the class of "all the white things in the world", defined by the 
property "being white", is not a natural kind. On the other hand, having rejected 
the essentialist conception for which membership in a kind is determined by an 
intrinsic set of necessary and sufficient properties, Khalidi needs to find an 
alternative theory to explain how natural kinds are associated with some relevant 
properties.  
Khalidi develops his own position by firstly examining and assessing a fairly 
recent non-essentialist view: the so-called "homeostatic property cluster" (HPC) 
account of natural kinds developed by Boyd (1999). In Boyd’s account, the 
properties associated with a natural kind are there for a reason – namely, a causal 
reason. Properties are not associated with a kind on conventionalist grounds but, 
rather, on the basis of a causal mechanism which keeps them together into a 
homeostatic cluster. Following HPC, to be a member of a kind entails possession of 
at least some of the properties involved in the causal mechanism which defines 
that kind. 
HPC has been widely discussed by philosophers of science, who have questioned 
whether such an account of natural kinds manages to escape the Scylla of 
essentialism and the Charybdis of conventionalism. On the one hand, it has been 
claimed that HPC simply substitutes the set of necessary and sufficient properties 
of traditional essentialism with causal mechanism, so that one could just say that 
the essence of a natural kind is its causal mechanism (Griffiths, 1999, p. 218). On 
the other hand, it has been pointed out that the individuation, delimitation and 
characterisation of a causal mechanism always involves a degree of 
conventionalism, especially when it comes to deciding whether two mechanisms 
are "mechanisms of the same kind". For example, saying that scientists look at 
what goes on in the hippocampus of a mouse in order to get a better 
understanding of how the human hippocampus works means saying that scientists 
agree to focus on the similarities between mice’s and humans’ hippocami while 
disregarding their (many) dissimilarities. In other words, in order to study the 
hippocampus of a mouse as if it was "the same as" a human hippocampus, scientists 
must conventionally agree that the causal differences between the two 
hippocampi are negligible (Craver, 2009, pp. 585-589). 
After examining the problems faced by HPC, Khalidi proposes to save the causal 
ingredient of Boyd’s account while dispensing with its homeostatic requirement 
and with the idea of a causal mechanism. With regards to the homeostatic 
requirement, Khalidi argues that the cluster of properties associated with a kind 
does not need to remain stable through time. Giving up the homeostatic 
requirement allows one to see why "etiological kinds" and kinds characterized by a 
"causal history" are as natural as the kinds characterized by a homeostatic and 
synchronic cluster of properties. It is therefore possible to explain, among several 
other examples, why the ever-evolving biological species are indeed natural kinds. 
Khalidi also dispenses with the idea of causal mechanism. As Anscombe (1993) 
pointed out, "cause" is a general concept, an umbrella term which covers different 
types of causal relations. To say that “C caused E” does not necessarily imply that 
“C caused E in virtue of a causal mechanism”. This means that properties 
belonging to the same cluster may entertain various types of causal relations 
without necessarily being part of a causal mechanism. 
Khalidi borrows from Craver the expression "simple causal theory" (SCT), for 
which “natural kinds are the kinds appearing in generalisations that correctly 
describe the causal structure of the world regardless of whether a mechanism 
explains the clustering of properties definitive of the kind” (Craver, 2009, p. 579). 
In Khalidi’s views, natural kinds are "nodes" associated with a set of properties 
whose co-instantiation causes the instantiation of other properties. For the SCT, 
such properties are not necessarily co-instantiated in virtue of a "homeostatic 
causal mechanism", but may be linked in virtue of other causal relations.   
One may wonder whether Khalidi’s SCT manages to dispense with the idea 
causal mechanisms after all. In other words, could it be that the "causal networks" 
of co-instantiated properties Khalidi talks about are actually causal mechanism in 
disguise? Khalidi’s rejection of the concept of a causal mechanism is motivated by 
his desire to include etiological and historical kinds among the natural kinds. What 
Khalidi argues against, therefore, is a particular conception on which mechanisms 
are rigid and unchangeable. However, several philosophers have moved away from 
this rather simplistic characterisation of a causal mechanism and toward more 
nuanced definitions. In recent years, causal mechanisms have been characterised 
as structures performing a function in virtue of their components (Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen, 2005), as complex systems in which some of their components 
produce a behaviour (Glennan, 2002), and as entities or activities producing 
regular changes (Machamer et al., 2000). More recently, the concept of a 
mechanism has become even more "liberalized" and it has been defined as 
organized entities and activities responsible for a phenomenon (Illari and 
Williamson, 2012). 
Khalidi’s "simple causal theory" thus risks being indeed too simple. Philosophers 
of a mechanistic persuasion may argue that "causal networks of co-instantiated 
properties" are still "mechanisms". Such mechanisms are not static, rigid and 
homeostatic; but, in fact, to reject the idea of a homeostatic mechanism does not 
imply rejecting the idea of a mechanism. For example and interestingly enough, 
Craver - from whom Khalidi borrows the idea of SCT - argues that functional 
explanations are just incomplete explanations awaiting the discovery and 
specification of the underlying causal mechanisms (Craver, 2007). It is true that 
Craver speaks only of neurological mechanisms – in other words, he does not 
develop a general theory of causal mechanisms across the sciences – but the point 
still remains that it is not entirely clear to what degree Khalidi’s argument for 
dispensing with causal mechanisms is capable of persuading someone who is 
convinced about the necessity of speaking of causality in mechanistic terms. 
If on the one hand it is debatable whether the substitution of causal 
mechanisms with SCT is successful, on the other hand one may even wonder 
whether Khalidi’s view could actually dispense with the concept of causality tout 
court. Khalidi speaks of properties clustered in causal networks without such 
causal networks necessarily being mechanisms; but why do these networks need to 
be "causal" to begin with? Perhaps one problem with Natural Categories and Human 
Kinds is that too little space is devoted to the hugely problematic concept of 
causality, which Khalidi presupposes without further clarification. Of course, 
making presuppositions is not bad in itself and it is often necessary: one cannot 
simply talk about everything and must make some assumptions in discussing any 
topic, especially considering that a topic like causality would arguably need a 
book-length treatment on its own. Nevertheless, since the concepts of causality, 
causal mechanism and causal explanation play a crucial role in his conception of 
natural kinds, Khalidi could have attempted to provide clearer definitions of such 
concepts. 
Finally, I wonder whether the metaphysical component of Khalidi’s conception 
of natural kinds can solve the “Euthyphro problem” mentioned at the end of the 
previous section. For Khalidi, defining natural kinds as “nodes in causal networks” 
should clarify why natural kinds correspond to the categories of science, even if 
not every category of science is a natural kind. In fact, while it may be the case 
that natural kinds are described by scientific laws, not every scientific law is about 
a natural kind. As Bird (2011) reminds us, this is the case of Newton’s law of 
gravitation, which takes the form of the following equation: 
i.  F = G (m₁ m₂/r2) 
where F stands for force, G for the gravitational constant, m₁ and m₂ for the 
masses of two objects and r for the distance between them. Equation (1) is indeed 
a scientific law, but no natural kind appears in it: "mass", in fact, is a property 
possessed by many kinds of entity. 
Bird also considers Coloumb’s law of electrostatic force: 
ii. F = −ε0 ( q₁ q₂/ r2) 
where F is force, ε0 is the Coloumb’s constant, q₁ and q₂ are two electrically 
charged bodies and r is the distance between them. As in the previous example, 
"being electrically charged" is a property possessed by many kinds of entity. 
Although one may say that both Newton’s law of gravitation and Coloumb’s law of 
electrostatic force are about the different kinds of entity which possess a mass and 
an electrical charge respectively, the point here is that such laws are not about a 
specific natural kind. The case of (2) does not even discriminate between 
positively charged entities and neutrally charged entities. To say that the scientific 
category of "either charged or neutral object" which appears in Coloumb’s law 
corresponds to a natural kind may stretch the concept of a natural kind too far. 
The problem is now the following: how can Khalidid’s conception explain why 
Newton’s law of gravitation and Coloumb’s constant do not involve natural kinds? It 
should not be controversial to say that "mass" is a projectible property associated 
with other properties: in fact, the mass of an object is associated to its resistance 
to being accelerated by a force and to its gravitational attraction to other bodies. 
In light of these considerations, perhaps it would be possible to regard "objects 
with a mass" as a node in a causal network of co-instantiated properties: does it 
mean that "objects with a mass" is a natural kind after all? We intuitively know 
that "objects with a mass" and "either charged or neutral object" are not natural 
kinds, but it is not entirely clear how Khalidi’s conception can save this intuition. 
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4 Scientific Domains 
As I explained in the previous sections, Khalidi argues against essentialism: he 
rejects the ideas that natural kinds must not overlap and that there is only one 
true classification system. Instead, he adopts a pluralistic and anti-reductionistic 
stance and he defends the idea that kinds may be both natural and cross-cutting. 
Khalidi’s view is developed on the basis of an appreciation of the structure of the 
sciences: we don’t find natural kinds only at the fundamental level of physics; 
special sciences (including the social sciences) discover and are about natural kinds 
too. In other words, “contemporary science reveals a world of multiple domains, 
each characterized by distinct causal process”. It is by looking at the actual 
structure of science that Khalidi comes to the conclusion that “there may be many 
more natural kinds than some philosophers might have expected” (Khalidi 2013, 
219). Indeed, one of the most interesting parts of Khalidi’s book is the account of 
scientific domains. 
In Khalidi’s view, natural kinds are associated with domains which are in turn 
the objects of study of scientific disciplines. For Khalidi, scientific domains are 
both “spatio-temporal” and “aspectual”. They are spatial in the sense that  the 
properties of a domain depend on its spatial scale – i.e., it makes sense to speak of 
the properties of viscosity or concentration only for large collections of molecules, 
while other properties are found only at a very small spatial scale. A domain also 
has temporal characteristics in the sense that, generally speaking, the size of the 
entities is inversely proportional to the time-scale of the processes they undergo – 
i.e., elementary particles decay in a matter of microseconds while the evolution of 
living organism by natural selection takes a much longer time.  
Domains are also aspectual in the sense that they reflect the “interests” with 
respect to which phenomena are investigated. Different domains may classify some 
of the entities at the same spatio-temporal level in different ways because they 
are interested in some of their properties rather than others. For example, the 
Linnaean subdivision in species and the entomological categories of larva and 
pupa group some of the same individuals in different ways because these 
classifications are interested in different properties at the level of the biological 
realm.    
In order to understand its novelty, I suggest contrasting Khalidi’s account of 
domains with some philosophical conceptions of so-called levels of reality. That 
Nature is organized into a hierarchy of levels is a view that may result palatable to 
many reductionists. In this view, in fact, there is the "fundamental level" of physics 
from which all the higher levels of the pyramid supervene. Not every scientist and 
philosopher accepts the pyramidal conception of Nature. Perhaps the world is not 
structured in a hierarchic fashion; instead of being organized into levels, it may 
contain a multiplicity of domains, governed by different laws, tracking different 
causal patterns and individuating different kinds. The world may be 
“dappled” (Cartwright, 1999). Although it represents one of the best known 
alternatives to the pyramidal conception of Nature, however, it must be said that 
Cartwright’s work is more concerned with the truth and scope of scientific laws, 
with what scientific models are about and with the boundaries between the 
sciences and their domains, rather than with the explication of what scientific 
domains consist of. 
A middle-way between the pyramid view and the dappled world view has been 
recently developed by Mitchell (2009). In Mitchell’s view, the world consists of 
levels of increasing complexity, with the higher levels not being completely 
reducible to the lower ones. The lower levels offer a range of possibilities, some of 
which will be actualized at the higher levels; which possibilities will be actualized 
at the higher levels, however, is a matter of contingency and cannot be predicted 
by looking at the lower levels only. In fact, not all the properties and phenomena 
manifesting at higher levels can be reduced to lower levels. Nevertheless, the 
range of lower-level possibilities puts non-trivial constraints on what can be 
realized at  higher levels: they establish, in a sense, the "rules" that must be 
followed at  higher levels. For example, although it is not entirely reducible to the 
physical level, the chemical level cannot instantiate "physical impossibilities". 
To clarify her view, Mitchell analyses the example of clinical or major 
depression. Depression has genetic causes (the presence of the gene 5-HTTP), bio-
chemical causes (at the level of the inhibited neurotransmitter), psychological 
causes (at the level of the personal history of the individual), social causes (at the 
level of the social context the individual lives in). The genetic cause is not 
sufficient, since the presence of the gene 5-HTTP simply increases the chance of 
developing depression (and, for yet unknown reasons, the chance is even higher if 
the gene is inherited from the mother). Furthermore, causes can work both ways – 
that is, both in a bottom-up and in a top-down fashion. For example, living in a 
deprived social environment may have an effect on bio-chemical processes at the 
neurological level. This example shows how, in Mitchell"s view, the world is not as 
dappled as Cartwright seems to claim, but the fact that it is organised into levels 
does not support reductionism either. 
It is unfortunate that Khalidi does not develop his conception of scientific 
domains in more detail, because I think it represents both a reasonable middle-
way between the dappled and the pyramid views and, at the same time, adds 
further complexity to Mitchell’s view. For Khalidi, scientific disciplines formulate 
laws and explanations about scientific domains; the scientific categories used in 
the scientific laws correspond to natural kinds, which are clusters of properties co-
instantiated by other properties. The properties associated with natural kinds do 
not need to be instantiated by the same clusters of properties – as in the already 
discussed case of the different networks of properties which instantiate the 
property of viscosity in solid, liquid or gaseous materials. On my reading, Khalidi’s 
proposal can also help us to understand that the kinds of a particular domain do 
not need to be all associated to all the properties instatiated of all the levels of 
that domain. 
To put Mitchell’s example in Khalidi’s terms, clinical depression is a kind of 
mental disorder associated to properties which have causes at the genetic, bio-
chemical, psychological and social level. However, not every kind of mental 
disorders classified by current psychiatry are associated to properties at so many 
levels. This would be the case, for instance, of the developmental disorders once 
known as autism, Asperger syndrome and pervasive developmental disorder not 
otherwise specified (PDD-NOS), and which the fifth edition of the American 
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual has recently lumped 
together under the category of autistic spectrum (AS). It appears, in fact, that AS 
is a node in a network of properties at the genetic, biochemical and neurological 
level, but not at the social and environmental level.  Although there is not a clear 
understanding of all its causes yet, in fact, the theories for which AS is caused by 
the psychological trauma of growing up in an emotionally cold environments (for 
example, with a detached mother) have been discarded. On the other hand, it may 
be the case that some mental disorders are mainly associated to properties at the 
psychological or environmental level, but not necessarily with properties at the 
genetic level. In short, the domain of psychiatry contains kinds associated to 
properties at different levels, but not every psychiatric kind is associated to 
properties situated at all the levels of the psychiatric domain.  
Khalidi defines scientific domains in spatio-temporal and aspectual terms. What 
emerges is a complex image of natural kinds associated to partially overlapping 
and domains which compenetrate different levels. I think that his view deserves to 
be developed in more detail and can potentially shed some new light on the 
relation between "domains", "levels" and "scientific disciplines" – a topic 
philosophers should pay more attention to. 
!
!
!
5 Conclusions 
Khalidi has developed a naturalistic theory of natural kinds which is anti-
essentialist and pluralist. His book offers a fresh perspective on the philosophy of 
natural kinds and it is my hope that both essentialists and anti-realists will respond 
accordingly, thus re-sparking the debate.  
Khalidi’s view relies on the notions of causality and causal mechanisms, which 
are hotly debated among philosophers. Progress in the understanding of these 
notions may shed new light on Khalidi’s original proposal. 
That said, Natural Categories and Human Kinds is written with exemplary clarity 
and the numerous examples from the special sciences are discussed patiently. This 
book is an exciting and timely contribution to the current debate on natural kinds 
and anyone remotely interested in this debate should read it. 
!
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